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Appellants/Plaintiffs ("Plaintiffs") have set forth in 
their brief the jurisdictional statement, nature of the proceed-
ings, statement of issues, determinative constitutional provi-
sions and statutes, a statement of the case and a statement of 
facts. Respondent, Board of Education of Salt Lake City School 
District (the "Board"), will not duplicate those items in this 
brief except to add facts omitted by Plaintiffs which the Board 
deems specifically relevant to the issues and/or to refute incor-
rect statements in Plaintiffs1 brief. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On page 1 of their brief, Plaintiffs assert that: 
The proceedings below consist of Plaintiffs' class 
action seeking: (1) an order of the court enjoining 
defendant . . . ; (2) a declaratory judgment determin-
ing that the Order is void and of no effect . . . ; (3) 
an order of the court directing notice to the Board of 
the particulars in which the Order violates [Utah law] 
. . . and giving the Board a reasonable opportunity to 
rescind the Order . . . ; and (4) for an order of the 
court granting Plaintiffs' judgment against the Board 
for a reasonable sum for the use and benefit of Plain-
tiffs' attorneys, and for costs incurred herein. 
Plaintiffs' Brief at p. 1. While all of the above appropriately 
characterize Plaintiffs' complaint, they do not properly charac-
terize the course of the proceedings below. First, Plaintiffs 
never sought and the court never certified this proceeding as a 
class action. Accordingly, this action has been maintained only 
on behalf of the named Plaintiffs. Second, in neither the 
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federal nor the state court proceedings have Plaintiffs pursued 
their claim for an injunction or their claim for "a reasonable 
sum for the use and benefit for Plaintiffs' attorneys and for 
costs incurred herein." Those issues were not ruled upon by the 
federal and state judges. Furthermore, the denial of those reme-
dies are not mentioned in Plaintiffs' docketing statement nor in 
their statement of issues presented for review. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
In their docketing statement, Plaintiffs set out two 
issues on appeal. Those issues correspond with issues B and C in 
Plaintiffs' brief. Plaintiffs' Brief at p. 2. Issue A, however, 
regarding Utah Constitutional Article I, Section 7, was not 
raised in Plaintiffs' docketing statement. In fact, Plaintiffs 
did not refer either the federal or state trial courts to that 
constitutional provision as part of their complaint or arguments 
1/ below.- Accordingly, that issue is not one properly before this 
court for its review. 
1/ When Judge Winder remanded this case from Federal Court to 
State Court he specifically remanded it for an "adjudication 
of plaintiff's claims based on Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-20 and 
Utah Constitution, Article X, Section 8." R. at 462. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Prior to January 1988, the Board operated four high 
schools with closed attendance area boundaries - that is, stu-
dents had to attend the high school located within their bound-
ary* The Board was required, pursuant to state law, to close one 
of the four high schools. It elected to close South High School. 
On January 19, 1988, the Board established new closed attendance 
area boundaries for the remaining three high schools. On or 
about March 5, 1988, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, chal-
lenging the decision on numerous grounds. Because some of the 
claims asserted were based on federal law, the Board petitioned 
to remove this action to the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah. The parties filed cross motions for summary 
judgment in that federal proceeding. After reviewing the plead-
ings, affidavits and depositions, and after oral argument, Judge 
David K. Winder, on July 22, 1988, issued his Memorandum Decision 
dismissing with prejudice all claims based on federal law and the 
United States Constitution. A copy of that decision is attached 
hereto as Addendum A. Pursuant to that Memorandum Decision, this 
case was remanded to the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County for the determination of Plaintiffs' claims 
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based on Utah Code Ann. § 53(A)-3-402- and Utah Constitution, 
3/ Article X, Section 8. R. at 162.-
The parties again filed cross motions for summary judg-
ment in the Third Judicial District Court with each party filing 
new memoranda and reply memoranda focusing on the state law 
claims. Oral argument on those renewed cross motions was held 
before the Honorable Scott Daniels on the 7th of November, 1988. 
Judge Daniels issued his Memorandum Decision on December 1, 1988. 
A copy of that Memorandum Decision is attached hereto as Addendum 
B. On December 30, 1988, Judge Daniels signed a summary judgment 
in favor of defendant Salt Lake City Board of Education, Record 
at 1056-57. It is that decision Plaintiffs ask this court to 
review. 
The Utah Legislature recodified Title 53 during its 1988 
general session. Title 53 has been replaced by Title 53A. 
The statute at issue is 53-6-20, which has been reclassified 
as 53A-3-402. The Board will refer to the prior section 
which was in effect at the time of the boundary decision. 
The following abbreviations are used throughout: The record 
on appeal, as paginated by the District Court Clerk, is des-
ignated "R"; the depositions have been paginated with the 
record on appeal, references to them will include their 
record page number and the name of the deponent. 
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II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The Board's Statement of Facts 
The Board submits the following additional facts to 
those set forth by Plaintiffs. These facts are helpful, if not 
necessary, to understand the context of the decision at issue. 
1. Salt Lake City School District (the "District") has 
had a pattern of declining enrollment over the past three 
decades. The peak enrollment was in 1957-58 at 42,000 students. 
Enrollment bottomed out in 1979-80 at 23,000 students and has 
shown slight increases over the past six years. The present 
enrollment is approximately 24,300 students with projections of 
further slight declines through the end of the century. Affida-
vit of John W. Bennion dated April 7, 1988 (hereinafter "Bennion 
Affidavit") at H6, R. at 145. 
2. Despite the declining enrollments, the District has 
continued to operate the same number of high schools it had when 
it had 42,000 students, resulting in under-utilized high school 
facilities. Id. at 117, R. at 145. 
3. During the 1983-84 school year, the Board held 
boundary hearings at which time questions of disparity among the 
educational programs and levels of support for the Districtfs 
high schools were raised. Id. at 118, R. at 145. 
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4. As a result of those hearings, the Board appointed 
an advisory citizen's committee called the "High School Improve-
ment Council" in January 1984. _Id. at U9, R. at 145. 
5. Among the recommendations of the High School 
Improvement Council was a suggestion that the Board study the 
possibility of closing a high school to improve secondary educa-
tion in the District. Id. at 110, R. at 146. 
6. The High School Improvement Council also recom-
mended that the Board continue the existence of the "Equivalency 
Committee", another advisory citizen's committee, to study the 
degree of comparability of District schools. Id. at til, R. at 
146. 
7* The Equivalency Committee's interim report docu-
mented disparity between the high schools and recommended steps 
to address that disparity, including the strengthening of pro-
grams at South and West High Schools, and suggested that the 
Board address issues regarding ethnic mix and academic opportuni-
ties in the high schools. Id. at U12, R. at 146. 
8. During late 1986 and early 1987, the District's 
staff and the Board discussed issues regarding school utilization 
and the staff prepared a preliminary proposal regarding the clo-
sure of South High School. Ld. at 1113, R. at 146. 
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9c That preliminary proposal sparked considerable pub-
lic debate and comment. Numerous board meetings and public hear-
ings were conducted regarding that proposal. Id. at 114, R. at 
146. 
10. During its 1987 session, the Utah Legislature 
passed Senate Bill 128, Utah Code Ann. § 53A-17-104 (formerly 
S 53-7-16.5). 
11. That statute requires Utah school districts to 
operate all of their schools at approximately 70% of their maxi-
mum student capacity or lose a portion of state funds allocated 
to support any school falling below that level of capacity. Id. 
12. On March 17, 1987, the Board voted to close a high 
school after the 1987-88 school year with the understanding that 
the school to be closed would be South High School. Bennion 
Affidavit at 115, R. at 146. 
13. The Board voted to keep South High open for the 
1987-88 school year, during which time an independent Citizen's 
Committee would study which of the four high schools should be 
closed and either concur with the decision to close South or rec-
ommend which of the other high schools should be closed. Id. at 
116, R. at 146-47. 
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14. The Board also voted to hire an outside consultant 
to work with the Citizen's Review Committee. Id. at 1117, FL at 
147. 
15. In April 1987, the Board appointed the advisory 
citizen's review committee pursuant to its decision on March 17, 
1987 and called it the High School Closure Committee ("Closure 
Committee"). Ld. at 1118, R. at 147. 
16. After its in-depth study with the assistance of an 
independent consultant, the Closure Committee gave its advisory 
opinion and concurred with the Board's recommendation to close 
South High School. Ld. at 1119, R. at 147. 
17. The Closure Committee recommended, among other 
things, that: (a) "the closing of South High can best be justi-
fied in terms of improved educational opportunities for all the 
high school students in Salt Lake City;" and, (b) "the Boundary 
Committee take care not to create high school attendance areas 
which put a high concentration of lower socioeconomic groups, 
pockets of high mobility, and minority students into any one of 
the remaining schools." Icl. at 1120, R. at 147. 
18. The decision to close South High necessitated the 
reassignment of the students who would have attended South High 
to the three remaining high schools which necessitated a 
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realignment of the boundaries within the district* Ld. at 1121, 
R. at 147. 
19. Since 1984, the Board has had a policy of closed 
boundaries for high school students. In other words, a student 
must attend the particular high school for his/her attendance 
area absent special circumstances and Board approval. Id. at 
122, R. at 147. 
20. The Board decided to continue the closed boundary 
policy for the three high schools remaining in operation for the 
1988-89 school year. Id. at H23, R. at 148. 
21. For its deliberations regarding the new boundaries 
for the high school attendance area, the Board unanimously 
adopted the following Statement of Purpose: 
It is the objective of the Salt Lake 
City Board of Education to have three out-
standing comprehensive high schools that are 
comparable in academic standards, course 
offerings, extracurricular programs, quality 
of staff, learning climate and student 
achievement. While recognizing that each 
school should be free to develop its own 
unique educational environment, the Board 
believes that any high school student in the 
city, regardless of place of residence, 
should have opportunities for education and 
participation in school activities similar to 
those of any other student in the District. 
Id. at 1128, R. at 148. 
22. The Board appointed another advisory citizen's 
committee called the High School Boundary Committee to provide 
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the Board with non-binding recommendations regarding boundaries. 
Id. at 124, R. at 148. 
23. The Boundary Committee was organized in the fol-
lowing manner: 
At the invitation of the board, each of the four 
high school administrations and community councils 
nominated four individuals for the Boundary Com-
mittee. From these nominations, the board 
selected two committee members from each high 
school area. In addition, it selected four at-
large members from the High School Closure Commit-
tee. The High School Boundary Committee members 
were approved as follows at a board meeting on 
October 6: Royal Hansen and Kent Linebaughi/ from 
East High area; Ralph Brinton and Gale Petersen 
from Highland High area; Ira Rose Fife and Guy 
Walker from South High area; Ann Clawson and Paul 
Hanks from West High area; and Andrew (Andy) 
Gallegos, Julie Monson, Steven Olsen and Pete 
Suazo as at-large members. 
Id. at 1f 27 and Ex. A, p. 4-5, R. at 149 and 163-64. 
24. The Board gave a charge to the High School Bound-
ary Committee that included the above quoted Statement of Pur-
pose, a Statement of Goals, Criteria and Final Statement to be 
used by the Boundary Committee in making its recommendations. 
The Statement of Goals, Criteria and Final Statement provided to 
the Boundary Committee are as follows: 
i/ Mr. Linebaugh also serves as co-counsel for Plaintiffs in 
this case. 
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STATEMENT OF GOALS 
In order to give clear direction to the High 
School Boundary Committee, the following 
statement has been adopted as a goals state-
ment as to what the school district wants to 
accomplish as new high school boundary lines 
are adopted. This statement of goals sup-
ports the "Statement of Purpose." 
a. In the aftermath of closure of one 
of our high schools, it is the goal of the 
school board to improve the educational 
opportunities for all of the district's high 
school students with care being taken to 
maintain the quality of programs at each of 
the three high schools. 
b. It is the goal of the school dis-
trict to treat the division of the existing 
South High School students with sensitivity, 
responding carefully to their needs. 
c. It is the goal of the Salt Lake City 
School District to develop three high schools 
with a balanced mix of resident high, middle 
and low achieving students to develop educa-
tional and cost-effective curricula which 
address the needs and challenges of all dis-
trict students. 
d. It is the goal of the school dis-
trict to achieve the "Statement of Purpose" 
and these goals through boundary changes as 
defined by approved criteria. 
Criteria of Significant Importance 
1. Achievement levels as close as pos-
sible using eighth grade data from Spring 
1987 and new eighth grade data for Fall 1987, 
striving for achievement differences ranging 
between six and 11 percentile points on the 
average for each school. 
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2e Minority balance as close as possi-
ble with a variance of no more than 12 per-
centage points, highest to lowest. 
3. Numeric balance as close as possible 
with a range of no more than 200 students 
among schools. 
4. Careful consideration be given 
neighborhood cohesiveness and unity. 
Criteria for secondary Concern 
That: 
lc Mobility factors and neighborhood 
stability be given careful consideration. 
2. Other data as deemed necessary. 
Final Statement 
Should the High School Boundary Committee 
find that it is unable to meet the stated 
goals given tight criteria, it may come back 
to the Board with data and rationale for a 
more moderate approach. 
Id. at 1123 & Ex. A, R. at 148 & 164-66. 
25. The Boundary Committee reviewed public input, 
received information from the District's staff and deliberated 
during the months of November and December, 1987. 
Complaint at 1131; Bennion Affidavit at 1126, R. at 13 & 148. 
26. The Committee established some rules of procedure 
for its deliberations including a rule requiring a 75% super 
majority vote to pass substantive matters. Complaint at 1130; 
Bennion Affidavit at 1128, R. at 149. 
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27. None of the boundary proposals recommended by the 
Boundary Committee received a 75% super majority vote. Id. 1129, 
R. at 149. 
28. Two proposed boundary maps, Map G and Map P, were 
approved by the Boundary Committee by votes of eight to four and 
six to four with two abstentions, respectively. Id. at 130, R. 
at 149. 
29. Although the Boundary Committee did not recommend 
any proposal by a 75% super majority, it did comply with the 
Board's request that it provide several proposals with an indica-
tion of how many members of the Boundary Committee supported each 
proposal. Id. at 131, R. at 149. 
30. On January 5, 1988, the Boundary Committee submit-
ted a report to the Board which was designated the Boundary 
Report. Complaint at 1132; Bennion Affidavit at 1132, R. at 13 & 
149. 
31. A Minority Report was also submitted to the Board 
on January 12, 1988. Complaint at U33; Bennion Affidavit at 133, 
R. at 13 & 149. 
32. On January 19, 1988, at its regularly scheduled 
board meeting and after additional public comment and hearing, 
the Board established closed attendance area boundaries for its 
high schools in accordance with Map G recommended in the Boundary 
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Report. Complaint at 1134; Bennion Affidavit at U34, R. at 14 & 
149-50. 
33. Before the Board made its decision, it had heard 
and received public comments of hundreds of individuals, had 
received recommendations from numerous advisory citizen's commit-
tees and had received information and input from the District's 
professional staff. Bennion Affidavit at 1135, R. at 150. 
34. The boundaries adopted by the Board meet all of 
the criteria it established and result in an increase of the num-
ber of students being bussed of only 4% above the minimum level 
required by closing South High. I_d. at 36, R. at 150. 
B. Factual Mischaracterizations Contained In Plaintiffs' 
Brief. 
The Board believes that all material facts necessary to 
the District Court's grant of summary judgment are undisputed. 
However, the Board takes issue with certain legal conclusions and 
characterizations made in Plaintiffs' statement of facts as set 
forth below: 
(a) The Board takes exception to Plaintiffs' referral 
to its boundary decision as "the Order." When Plaintiffs filed 
this complaint, it referred to the Board's boundary decision as 
"the Order" to apparently fall within federal anti-bussing legis-
lation which prohibits certain types of "orders." Notwithstand-
ing Judge Winder's decision throwing out all federal claims, 
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Plaintiffs continue to refer to the boundary decision as "the 
Order." To the extent the Plaintiffs attempt to attach any legal 
significance to that terminology, the Board disputes it. 
(b) The Board believes paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs1 
statement of facts may be misleading. Paragraph 6 refers to the 
boundary decision as creating "closed boundaries." However, the 
boundaries for high school students were closed both prior to and 
after the boundary decision at issue. See Statement of Facts 
1119, supra. 
(c) The Board disputes several characterizations in 
paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs1 statement of facts. There is no evi-
dence in the record to suggest that the "purpose" of the "order" 
is as Plaintiffs state. Furthermore, Plaintiffs1 characteriza-
tions in paragraph 7 amount to legal conclusions and not facts. 
(d) The Board disputes the contention contained 
throughout Plaintiffs1 statement of facts and brief, but in par-
ticular in paragraphs 7 through 13, that a student has "the 
right" to attend any particular school of his/her choice. First, 
that statement amounts to a legal conclusion rather than a fact. 
Second, Plaintiffs admit that the Board has authority to assign 
students to particular schools. E.g., R. at 518-19. What the 
Plaintiffs disagree with in this case are the criteria used by 
the Board to establish the boundaries. 
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(f) The Board also disputes the suggestion in para-
graphs 8 through 13 of Plaintiffs1 statement of facts that a 
majority of the Board considered the socioeconomic status of stu-
dents in arriving at its boundary decision. The Board admits 
that Mr. Keith Stepan, one of the Board members who voted in 
favor of the boundary decision, considered in general the socio-
economic status of the students. However, Mr. Stepan does not 
speak for the remaining members of the Board. When asked by 
Plaintiffs' counsel in that regard, Mr. Stepan's testified as 
follows: 
Qe (By-Mr. Linebaugh) Based on your conversations 
and discussions with the other three who together with 
you voted for the order, do you know of any of them who 
did not take into consideration the same factors that 
you did in voting for the order? 
A. I think our conversation was around the criteria, 
Yes. I think they took in similar considerations that 
I did. 
Record at p. 665, (deposition of Keith Stepan)(emphasis added). 
Mr. Stepan's testimony is not conclusive that the other members 
of the Board voting for the decision considered a student's 
socioeconomic status. 
(g) The Board disputes Plaintiffs' statement of fact 
No. 15 as a legal conclusion and not a statement of fact. 
(h) The Board also disputes paragraph 16 in that it is 
incomplete. While it is true that a plan could have been adopted 
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that would not have balanced students on the basis of academic 
achievement or the other criteria adopted by the Board, that plan 
would not have resulted in schools that were even balanced numer-
ically. See Bennion Affidavit, Ex. A: Boundary Report (Adden-
dum) , R. at 175-202. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Plaintiffs are precluded from arguing that the 
Board1s boundary decision violated their rights under Article I, 
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution because they did not raise the 
issue below. Moreover, in granting the Board summary judgment 
prior to remanding the case to state court, Judge Winder ruled 
that the boundary decision did not deprive Plaintiffs of liberty 
or unduly infringe upon parental rights under the Federal Consti-
tution. That reasoning is persuasive with regard to Utah Consti-
tution, Article I, Section 7. 
2. The boundary decision did not create a partisan 
test under Article X, Section 8 of the Utah Constitution. In 
drawing boundary lines, the Board did not consider adherence of 
students to any cause or political party. The objective academic 
and other factors used by the Board are lacking in partisanship. 
3. The Board acted within its statutory authority in 
drawing the boundary lines. While drawing school boundary lines 
is not an expressly enumerated power of school boards under 
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Section 53-6-20, it is authorized under Section 53-6-20(4), (13) 
& (14) which empowers school boards to "do all things necessary 
for the maintenance, propriety and success of schools and the 
promotion of education." The extremely narrow reading of the 
word "necessary" in Section 53-6-20(14) urged by Plaintiffs is 
contrary to both Utah case law and decisions from other 
jurisdictions. 
4o The Board's boundary decision was based on care-
fully considered factors after months of study, public input, and 
deliberation. The Board considered factors legitimately related 
to promoting the academic achievement and social development of 
the students. The record establishes that the boundary decision 
was not arbitrary and capricious as a matter of law. 
5. Students have no right to attend a particular 
school under Utah law. Neither do parents have a right to send 
their children to a particular public school. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs admit that a school board may assign stu-
dents to attend a particular school. E.g.f R. at 518-19. Plain-
tiffs further admit that the attendance areas for particular 
schools may be closed, that is a student must attend the school 
to which he or she is assigned. Id. Plaintiffs1 only argument 
is that the factors considered by the Board are impermissible. 
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Plaintiffs i Mi-. n J ill iihj HI i.dse stating that the factors con-
sidered are impermissible, but cm„,y u.c - •".-:. r ney are "--p.* -ary 
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v • •3 : " d°> erne ' ^urpose and 
Statement 01 Goals : Statement ot Facts 11121 & 24, supra. 
I. THE BOARD'S BOUNDARY
 D E C I S I 0 N D 0 E S NQT VIOLATE PLAINTIFFS' 
LIBERTY INTEREST ESTABLISHED BY UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 
I, SECTION 7, 
A< ' o1" ed ^r *~ '- -3 1 f ; s * " . 
dec: 1 • t w e i n g 
r a i s e o :ur r ~ e • ir<t - ,pt- -• •;. ea . u>Qrthernv - *- ^ S S P ^ -
f
 1 o r i s w: t * ^ ' * *: m eT i 
- _ ^ t J .„* . i f ' - l e d ^' 1 . '. i s * " i fc 
'-."our- :oi t , - : ) . i : 4 r: - ,,s • - 5L„ q, * ^ ; - c . '•', J!^. 
Judye Wirl^ 
jw^pwi , ' ; !.*- - ,1 .Ujiisei . c» P r.: t r ^ .... ' *~ * , 
wiridt- viemora^dum r.p--..- , * .* 
edu t j d -ed , a : ^ * . : : " B r . e i .; ^ . . * * . _ . , . * u * n t . : i s do 
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not quote the remainder of Judge Winder's decision on the issue. 
Judge Winder wrote: 
Plaintiff relies on the above cases claiming that 
her right to direct the education of her children takes 
priority over the state's rights to create school 
attendance zones. The court disagrees. 
. . . Any law which interferes with a fundamental 
rights must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compel-
ling state interest. However, the right to attend a 
particular school is not a fundamental right. Thus, 
the district zoning decision need only be rationally 
related to a legitimate state interest. "Providing 
public schools ranks at the apex of the function of a 
state." Thus, the state has a legitimate interest in 
controlling education. Further, dividing students up 
to insure a diverse student body is related to the 
state's interest in education. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment 
claim based on parents' rights is dismissed. 
Memorandum Decision at p. 15; R. at 950 (citations omitted). 
Plaintiffs never appealed Judge Winder's ruling. Nev-
ertheless, when this case was remanded to the state court, Plain-
tiffs asserted the same arguments presented to and rejected by 
Judge Winder. E.g., R. at 497-502. Plaintiffs advanced those 
arguments without ever referring to Utah Constitution, Article I, 
Section 7. Judge Daniels, like Judge Winder, rejected those 
arguments. 
Plaintiffs now raise the same arguments before this 
Court. However, they now argue that the boundary decision is in 
violation of Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7. But, as 
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Winder r u l e c * :.dt • w Boa1**! - * i-n-Or ^ec i s ; 
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Cohbt i . u t i ^ , A o c o r . l . n g i - - Boar- s 1ec i s ." *-*- * ^ ^ a t e 
P l a i n t i f f s ' - ; g i l t s undei Axt 
V 
i 
Wh . le * h , s '*•."> ,n nas • * .^^irpssei r H o *rs\-j nai'fMi 
ta; :hcv. • , „ Sect ion 
7 t <e UKQ ^.onsirn' 'or, * .db adaressed that *ss<.«- i he 
context of Jtah Constitution, Article X, Se * , • i«q«i i , \ 
ii iMii system, whicn shau ne npen 10 aiJ children of 
6/ 
5/ Plaintiffs cite Untermyer v. State Tax. Commission, 102 Utah 
214, 129 P.2d 881", 885-86 "(1942), for that proposition, The 
case of Vali Convalescent & Care Institution v. Industrial 
Commission, 649 P.2d 33, 35-36 (Utah 1982), is also in 
accord. 
The Bod.-J recognizes t:r:cf ne r, : ;t .. ,c^r :.ht ;•._ .rtee;^ . 
Amendment and the rights under Utan Constitution, Article I, 
Section 7, are not; necessarily coextensive. See. GJJW_ v, 
Dept. of Employment Security, 68] P. 2d 8C7, 82b (Utah 
1984)(Durham, J. concurring and dissenting). However, 
Plaintiffs have not advanced, nor car they in this context, 
any rationale that the protections of Article :, Section 7 
of the "'al: Constitution should be greater than the protec-
tions ot the Four-eer*v* -Tiendmen4" t~ tie United States 
Consti*- - - :^ ' , 
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the state;" Utah Constitution, Article X, Section 1. In Logan 
City School District v. Kowallis, 94 Utah 342, 77 P.2d 348 
(1938), this court addressed the requirement of open schools. 
The provision for being open . . . simply 
means that all children must have equal rights and 
opportunity to attend the grade or class of school for 
which such child is suited by previous training or 
development. 
It is also noted that there is no requirement that 
every school building shall be open to every school 
child in the state. The provision is that the system 
of public schools shall be open to all children of the 
state. There shall be provided, for each child in the 
state, a school suitable to its development and train-
ing, and as reasonably convenient for attendance as is 
practicable, which school such child shall have a right 
to attend. And when the public schools are open to all 
children on the same and equal terms, compliance has 
been had with this clause of the Constitution. 
Id. 77 P.2d at 351. 
Plaintiffs have neither a fundamental right under the 
Federal Constitution nor under the Utah Constitution to choose 
which school among public schools their children attend. Their 
argument regarding Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7, is 
not well-taken. 
II. THE BOARD'S ACTION DID NOT CREATE A "PARTISAN TEST OR QUALI-
FICATION" UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Plaintiffs also assert that the Board's attendance area 
boundary decision constitutes a "partisan" test under Article X, 
Section 8 of the Utah Constitution which provides: 
No religious or partisan test or quali-
fication shall be required as a condition of 
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1: - joar-: -^ f. -. -•: 10 Utah case addressing the rerm 
"partisan" useu n. "is i n nLn \\ " \ iniw M M I IUIMI1/, m w-
ever, J c i n e s partisa . o^ « * ir:ei t- - • art ic . n part. 
cause i. apposed r * ^  *Mjb!i^ ^tor. . - * * - ^^ ^ 
Pic. ijiid, / u . <* ^ai/' is qeie' -
all associated wirr. ».-J" \* ,noi u . .1 ' .j.n, C . - a I 
par" See ' ' v • 1 
t ^rw„ - .. ... , ionpai iad- '^d- >J see a^so 
State v. Haley, o? * ask a -~ 1 / V^LOLLUL^ 
y^ .a iedx Ofjanizauf.' 1 actio" o: ? ti^it. j.-i-.e^ J1 -^  --
political par »• i es > 
1- - ., attempt to characterize groups of students 
residing in d particular area a^ partisan factions ignores 1 he 
common political r.unn, l.il I " "Lnul ill* « ul ( 
del m e partisan without, the ele en - 1* . let or adherence to a 
7/ 
cause.-"" The tact that a stude..L i.u^^n- ^o reside within a 
^u-.— of the p.ai-iiffs attempt to define 
tor the purp* -his case. That definition, 
'icvever does m * eve resemble • ne various legal and dic-
• ionary aefinr.io^ i' . -' . -; a / r i b y p 1 a i n t i f f s o n pages 
24-26 ot their : r 
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particular geographical boundary hardly makes the student "a firm 
adherent to a party, action, cause or person." The factors con-
sidered by the Board in establishing attendance areas were objec-
tive factors unrelated to a students1 political affiliation, 
beliefs or support concerning any social issues. 
There is nothing partisan about a school board consid-
ering racial balance, different levels of academic achievement 
and geographic location in drawing school boundary lines. Plain-
tiffs1 attempted characterization of the classifications as par-
tisan factions or groups stretches the meaning of partisan beyond 
recognition If Plaintiffs1 argument were carried to any logical 
conclusion, the Board would be precluded from making any classi-
fications between students even if there were compelling reasons 
to do so. Arguably, under Plaintiffs1 definition, the Board 
could not classify students on the basis of age, gender, grade or 
any other basis. 
Plaintiffs even suggest that the Board has violated 
this Court's mandate in Logan School Dist. v. Kowallis, 94 Utah 
342, 77 P.2d 348 (1938). To support that position, Plaintiffs 
quote from 77 P.2d at 350. Plaintiffs' Brief at p. 25. However, 
8 / Plaintiffs fail to quote the case in context.- The issue 
£/ The Kowallis court stated: 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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add. vs»sew *-ha^ per4-: or. -f the Kovallis dec is lor !s *-* 
of .11* ~ess t; Z»J^ * bcnooib, nui u u 
t 
Throughout "leif "pdi-isar • e~ '' d:s<-u<^ •« D •* . n • lis 
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Pldi M i f f s' 3r e^ e* • »• v*. « • in iacL, 
t* r ^c f^ state that ^ drd 
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Footnote continued from previous page. 
"The requirement that the schools must be opened to all 
children of the state is a prohibition against any law 
or rule which would separate or divide the children of 
fc
' • state into classes or groups, and grant, allow,, or 
provide one group or class educational privileges or 
advantages denied another.. No child of school age, 
resident wi th in the stat e, can be lawfully denied 
admission to the schools of the state because of race, 
color, location, religion, politics, or any other bar 
or barrier which may be set up which, would deny to such 
child equality of educational opportunities or facili-
t i e s w i t h a 3 1 o t h e r : h i 1 d r e n o £ t h e s t a. t e..,f 
Kovallis 77 P. 2d at 35Of 
Throughout those characterizations, Plaintiffs choose 
to highlight the harm to West High patrons and students. How-
ever, as noted above, the advisory citizens committee which rec-
ommended the boundary decision that was adopted by the Board con-
sisted of two representatives from each of the schools and four 
at-large members. The only boundary committee representatives 
that did not join in the majority report were those from East 
(including co-counsel for Plaintiffs, Mr. Linebaugh) and Highland 
High Schools. 
Plaintiffs1 arguments regarding Utah Constitution, 
Article X, Section 8 and their characterizations of the boundary 
decision are not well founded either in the law or in the record. 
The Boundary decision does not violate Article X, Section 8 of 
the Utah Constitution. 
III. THE BOARD'S BOUNDARY DECISION WAS WITHIN ITS STATUTORY 
AUTHORITY. 
A. The Board Has Broad Authority To Manage And Control 
Its Schools, Including Establishing Closed Attendance 
Boundaries. 
In general, the Board's powers are governed by the Utah 
Constitution and Statutes. It has the powers expressly conferred 
upon it by the Legislature and the implied powers that are neces-
sary to execute and to carry into effect its express powers. 
Beard v. Board of Education, 81 Utah 51, 16 P.2d 900, 903 (1932). 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-20 provided, in pertinent part: 
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(2) pu rc h as e, se11, and ma k e Imp rove -
ments on school sites, buildings, and equip-
ment and construct, erect, and furnish school 
buildings , 
(4)
 e stablish, locate ai id maintain ele-
mentary, secondary and vocational schools . . 
( judKe c , . . ^ : J: . -..- ^vjeosary 
for the control and management oi the dis-
trict school 0 
( 14'» :. a,. \ . . ^b necessary tor t. te 
maintenance, prosperity, ar>£ success of the 
Utah Code A • ^ 5t-^ /•, r-^iew : * s -= -T -*v 'a juage 
out] ined ahri j *••"* r nniar in x v- r 
statutes, r- . ;..•„•* . • ^ stated that " • -^ •  . - -^ . A 
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it have a broad latitude of discretion in order to carry out its 
objective of providing the best possible school system in the 
most efficient and economical way." Id. 
In light of the Boardfs authority to maintain high 
schools and to do all things "necessary for the control of and 
management of the school district" and "all things necessary for 
the maintenance, prosperity, and success of the schools and the 
promotion of education," the Board's decision establishing atten-
dance area boundaries for its high schools is within the scope of 
the powers granted to it. 
The issue of assigning students to particular schools 
was addressed in this Court's decision in Logan City School Dis-
trict v. Kowallis, 94 Utah 342, 77 P.2d 348 (1938). In Kowallis, 
a parent who resided in the Cache County School District, but who 
worked in Logan City and sent his children to Logan City schools, 
challenged a rule adopted by the Logan City School District 
requiring the payment of a non-resident fee. In rejecting the 
parent's attack of the non-resident fee, the Kowallis court dis-
cussed a school district's powers and responsibilities over its 
students and non-resident students seeking admission to its 
schools. In that discussion, the court stated: 
In the orderly administration of the 
school system, to prevent overcrowding at 
some schools, to insure an adequate teaching 
faculty, rooms, seats, equipment, grounds for 
recreation, to protect health, and secure to 
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al 1 ch11 d: EM: i the greatest possible amount of 
contact witl 1, and personal attention from, 
the teachers, that their individual needs may 
be met (as well as convenience in attending 
school), districts are maintained, and even 
assignment of pupils within a district to 
particular schools is authorized and neces-
sary. . , . To secure to every child in the 
state the maximum benefit of the school sys-
tem., the ass i g nme nt o f c hi1d r e n t o par t i c u1a r 
schools is often essential. Economy and 
efficiency in school operation and adminis-
tration, as we] 1 as effectuating and making 
possible the harmonious development and 
growth of all school children, would be seri-
ously impaired were students permitted to 
shift or change, at their own volition, from, 
one scho o 1 t o ano t he r , 
Id, nn P,}c o< ]53. Thus, the Board's decision to establish 
attendance -^f-^ boundaries for the hnjh schools is mil mil,1 
w ; ~ \z
 r.*- ,>, but promotes the educational we 1 1 -• be i in- • +.uf* 
students it serves., 
B • The rsoarg's AuLriunt, ;o sstabiisfr AL tendance Boundaries 
Is Not Limited, In This Case, By The Doctrine Of Ejusdem 
Generis. 
Plaintiffs dc^nowiedo^ v *- "o'i1' 5 ^ ' ^ L : — ~ 
a-, • - the 
B o a r o ' s pow*-'C . .sae: * -ie cu. f i ie cr e iusdem g e n e r i s . Aqa i~ . 
P ' r i ' ^ i f f s ' J " n , ] ! n e r t - ' . * *' i i . r u b l , r i d i r . *' J 
t . +-o r r p a c q i T r o n , g 
Law "[ i rt ion a r ;. 
E * „sc*Ji• ue..^ . y
 t i>« .• i w»_ .J^i K, * iOL , ^  * o o o f or 
nature. In the construction of \a**, wills, and other 
instruments, the "ejusdem oeneris rile" :sr that where 
gen^**3^ .^-M^C ff> •--- ~. - .- ^ era* "^  " or 
things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, 
such general words are not to be construed in their 
widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to 
persons or things of the same general kind or class as 
those specifically mentioned. The rule, however, does 
not necessarily require that the general provision be 
limited in its scope for the identical things specifi-
cally named. Nor does it apply when the context mani-
fest a contrary intention. 
Black's Law Dictionary, 464 (5th ed. 1979)(citations 
omitted)(emphasis added to portions not quoted by Plaintiffs). 
The Board submits that the intent of the Legislature 
was to give it the power to do all things necessary for the pro-
motion of education, whether discussed in the proceeding enumer-
ated powers or not. First, the recently reenacted provision pro-
vides that "a Board shall do all other things necessary for the 
maintenance, prosperity, and success of the schools in the promo-
tion of education." Utah Code Ann. § 53A-3-402Q6) (1988). 
In addition, a few examples of the things found to be 
within these powers demonstrates that the grant of authority is 
not limited by the preceding enumerated powers. This Court has 
held that extra-curricular activities and student body organiza-
tions fall within that provision. See Beard v. Board of Educa-
tion, 81 Utah 51, 16 P.2d 900, 906 (1932).-' These examples lead 
1/ The Utah Attorney General's Office has opined that Utah 
school districts operate school lunch programs pursuant to 
that authority. Informal Opinion No. 85-37, dated August 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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one to the conclusion that the Legislature meant exactly what it 
sai d a] ] tl li i 1 gs i lecessary. . - ' . ;' • • • •. 
Even assuming the doctrine of eiusdem .generis applies, 
th e Kovallis case states that a board may establish attendance 
bound a r i e s • See pages 29 3 0 , supra. A II s • ::) 1 1 I e bo u nd a r y decision 
i s s i m i 1 a r t o in a i i y o f t h e e n urn e r a t e d p o w e r s a n d £ a 1 1 s w i t h :i n a n y 
cor _ >saeir. generis . I • :: i 5xamp ] 5 1 io * :::::ai i 11 i• 5 B :: • a::i ::i 
"establish, . •..; a i e and ma i nt a i n sc hoo I s "*' U t a h Cod e An n . 
S 53-f--/^'' • * ". cannot assi gn students ' uiose schools. 
(
 m e Hoard's Boundary Decision Was A Discretionary 
Decision Within Its Express And Implied Powers And As 
Such, It Is Not Subject To Judicial Attack Absent 
Compelling Reasons. 
Next, P1a int if f s as s e r t t hat t h e Boar d's bo und a ry de c i-
s i o i i ' i" a s I i ] t r a i i: e s a s i \: ::) 1: r i I e c e s s a i y " f o i: !:: 1 I e m a :i i 11 e i i a i i ::  e , 
prosperity and success of the schools ar id the promotion of educa-
tion, P1 aintiffs def ine necessary as synonymous with indispen,s -
able. Sucl I a reading is not supported ^' T * ^ rase law and deci-
sions o f o t h e r s t a t e s . 
Footnote continued from previ oi is page, 
12, 198 5 . 11 i f ac t, t1 Ie A11 o i: i i e y G e i ie r a 1' s 0 f f ice 1 I as op i i ied 
that if the Board believed that allowing a teachers' associ-
ation representative to conduct Association business on 
school time would promote education, the Board would be 
authorized to adopt a policy allowing such condi ict Li .for -
mal Opinion No. 85-73, dated March 11, 1986. 
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For example, the Maine Supreme Court in Maine School 
Administrative District No, 15 v. Raynolds, 413 A.2d 523 (Me, 
1980), was faced with the interpretation of a statute providing 
that "the State Board of Education may make such reasonable regu-
lations as it may find necessary for carrying out the purposes, 
provisions and intent of these sections." The Maine Supreme 
Court stated that "'necessary1 in this context meaning not 
'indispensable1 but rather 'convenient' or 'helpful' in effectu-
ating the purposes of the Act." Id. at 531. 
Similarly, in Kay County Excise Board v. Atkinson, T. & 
S. F. Railroad, 185 Okla. 327, 91 P.2d 1087 (1939), the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court interpreted a statute granting the Board of Educa-
tion the power to "incur all expenses, within the limitations 
provided by law, necessary to carry out and fulfill all powers 
herein granted." The railroad challenged the School Board's 
authority to purchase band uniforms for use in the band and music 
department of its high school as unnecessary for education. In 
addressing that argument, the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated: 
The word "necessary" must be considered 
in the connection in which it is used, as it 
is a word susceptible of various meanings. 
It may import absolute physical necessity or 
inevitability, or it may import that which is 
only convenient, useful, appropriate, suit-
able, proper or conducive to the end sought. 
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fjiie v e s t i n g o: oroad powers and di s c r e -
t.on in the Board of Education . , . points 
readily to t he t houg~t that the Legislature 
did not intend to so restrict such Board as 
to limit expenses only for things indispens-
able to the maintenance and operation of its 
public school system; and we conclude that 
such expenses as are convenient, useful, 
appropriate, suitable, proper or conducive to 
the desired ends of the general program, and 
to the conduct of such school system, are 
authorized to be incurred thereunder, in the 
discretion of the Board, un1ess otherwi se 
restricted by ] aw 
Id. at 1088 & 1 089, 
F ' ii n a 11! j , 11 i e U1: a 1 I :: a s • 2 : £ Be a i d v . Boa rd o i Kd lie a t i < J I I , 
81 Utah 51, 16 P.2d 900 (1932), is analogous. In that case, a 
taxpayer cha11e nged t h e use o f schoo 1 f \ I i I ds fo r (1 ) 
e.x t r o < * . £>,;;^u. 
building aru: , ! tor -;t est.-*:- .shine- * -. o " .^  r :. . , o: t ^  
Studer- ho*" ...i - t 
body organizatio'. *a:<. .i i u.m *: • n^ e.„ -win \>n. ^ysr,ei? ? ** 
District, ___ ^poea> tHe !i*ah s u p r e ^ , * ? fa fe<^ 
tr.t- organized stude: t body ,.,: 'he North s,xiu 
mit High School is no-, part, o: tne educa-
tional system of the iistnct. While not 
required by statute as part of the minimum 
educational prog r a m, i t I s w 11:1 11 n t h e p o w e r 
of the board of education to authorize ai i :i 
maintain such an organization as one of tl le 
required educational activities and as part 
of the educational system of the district. 
[l]t may do [so] pursuant to the provisions 
o f Sect!o n 4617, whe reIn 11 is empowe r ed "t o 
do a 1 1 t hIng s ne ed f u 1 fo r 11 I e ma i n t e n anc e, 
34 
prosperity and success of the schools, and 
the promotion of education." 
16 P.2d at 906. The term "needful" in the predecessor statute 
has now been changed to "necessary." If Plaintiffs1 arguments 
were adopted, needful would also have to mean indispensable. A 
student body organization is not an indispensable part of the 
educational system. In fact, if necessary were confined to 
indispensable, many programs, including athletics, 
extra-curricular activities, driver's education, etc., might be 
subject to attack as not indispensable to education. 
The Board's order is certainly convenient, useful, 
appropriate, suitable, proper and conducive to the maintenance, 
prosperity and success of the schools and the promotion of educa-
tion. See, Keegan Affidavit at 1W5-9, R. at 397 and Statement of 
Facts 111121-24, supra. The boundary decision is within the 
Board's statutory authority. Plaintiffs simply disagree with the 
Board's decision and are attempting to contort Utah law to have 
their judgment superimposed over the judgment of the elected rep-
resentatives of the School District. 
Because the Board has the right, indeed the responsi-
bility, to establish attendance area boundaries for its schools, 
Plaintiffs' attack on the Board's decision is an attack on a dis-
cretionary function of the School Board, which attack, absent 
exceptional circumstances, will not be sustained. 
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This for the reason that the decision as 
to what is best for the school children of 
the district is left to the decision of the 
Board of Education by the Legislature of the 
State of Utah, the body which created it, and 
is not incumbent upon that board to convince 
the court as to the wisdom, expediency or the 
advantage to be gained by such decision. 
. . . There are remedies available to any 
citizens of a district who believe the board 
of education has acted unwisely or will so 
act in the future. One is by petition to the 
board and the other is by election of new 
members. The exercise of discretion within 
legal limits will not be interfered with by 
the courts except for compelling, legal or 
equitable reasons where the board has clearly 
abused the discretion vested in it. 
Allen v. Board of Education, 120 Utah 566, 236 P.2d 756, 758-59 
(1951). 
Plaintiffs' arguments regarding the Board's authority 
are not only unfounded in Utah law, they are also contrary to the 
decisions of other states. E.g., Guida v. Board of Education, 26 
Conn. Supp. 121, 213 A.2d 843 (1965); Tyska v. Board of Educa-
tion, 117 111. App. 3d 917, 453 N.E.2d 1344 (1983). 
In Guida v. Board of Education, plaintiff challenged 
the board's decision to redraw the attendance boundaries for two 
junior high schools, one predominately black and the other pre-
dominately white. The board decided that all seventh graders in 
the combined area would attend one junior high and all eighth 
graders in the combined area would attend the other junior high. 
Plaintiff claimed that such a change amounted to discriminating 
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against the children transported as well as against those not 
similarly transported. Guidaf 213 A.2d at 844. The Superior 
Court of Connecticut, however, stated that: 
While recognition is given to the extensive powers 
enjoyed by boards of education, claim is made that the 
problem of racial imbalance is one requiring legisla-
tive enactment and is beyond their power. . . . The 
[board's] report dealt not only with the racial imbal-
ance problem but also considered improvement in the 
overall quality of instruction possible,. . . . There 
is no constitutional prohibition on the board against 
taking into account, in addition to other relevant mat-
ters, the factor of racial imbalance. And the board 
need not "close its eyes to racial imbalance in its 
schools which, though fortuitous in origin, presents 
much the same disadvantages as are presented by segre-
gated schools." . . . [A] determination by the board 
which is otherwise lawful and reasonable does not 
become unlawful merely because the factor of racial 
imbalance is accorded relevance. 
Similarly, in Tyska v. Board of Education, the board 
decided to close a high school and reassign its freshman students 
to other high schools. In rejecting plaintiff's arguments, the 
Illinois Appellant Court noted, as this Court has noted, that 
boards of education enjoy broad latitude in the realm of educa-
tion. 453 N.E.2d at 1350. The Tyska court went on to note that: 
The decision to close a school and to reassign the stu-
dents to other attendance zones within the district is 
an exercise of the discretionary powers granted to the 
board to act as a policy-making body, tantamount to the 
quasi-legislative power to make prospective regulations 
and orders. The decision involves a public policy 
question concerning the school system and the district 
as a whole, and not an adversarial adjudication of the 
rights of individuals. . . . A board of education in 
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the exercise of its discretionary powers may discon-
tinue or abandon the use of public school within the 
boundaries of its jurisdiction and assign the students 
thereof to other schools in the school system. 
Id. at 1353-54 (citations omitted). 
Plaintiffs have not cited any authority for the propo-
sition that boards of education in this State or any other state 
cannot draw attendance zones using the criteria used in this 
case. To the contrary, there are many federal and state cases— 
such as those cited above. 
D. The Board's Decision Was Not Arbitrary And Capricious 
And Not An Abuse Of The Board's Discretion. 
Plaintiffs also argue that the Board's decision was 
arbitrary and capricious and/or an abuse of its discretion. The 
undisputed facts and the Plaintiffs' own allegations demonstrate 
the Board's decision was made after considerable deliberation and 
discussion and was not arbitrary or capricious. 
On September 1, the Board adopted its Statement of Pur-
pose for its boundary line deliberations. Complaint at 1128, R. 
at 11. In October, the Board formed and charged a twelve member 
Boundary Committee to formulate proposals pursuant to the State-
ment of Purpose, a Statement of Goals and certain criteria. Com-
plaint at 1129, R. at 11-13. The Boundary Committee deliberated 
ID/ These cases were cited to the federal court below in the 
Board's memorandum. R. at pp. 259-65. 
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for two months regarding proposed boundary lines. Complaint at 
H31, R. at 13. The Board received a Boundary Report and a Minor-
ity Report from the Boundary Committee. Complaint at 1W32 & 33, 
R. at 13-14. Subsequently, on January 19, 1988, the Board made 
its decision regarding attendance area boundaries. Complaint at 
1134, R. at 14. Even according to Plaintiffs1 Complaint, the 
Board spent considerable time and obtained considerable input 
regarding its boundary decision. As a matter of law, its actions 
were not arbitrary and capricious nor an abuse of its discretion. 
Furthermore, as set forth in the Statement of Facts, 
the above represents only a few months of the study and delibera-
tion that preceded the boundary decision. Those deliberations, 
public hearings and comment were on-going in one form or another 
since the 1983-84 school year. The information contained in the 
Boundary Report and Minority Report — a l o n e would sustain the 
Board's decision. 
In arguing that the Board's boundary decision was arbi-
trary and capricious, Plaintiffs contend that the Board did not 
base its decision on the criteria of Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-20. 
Plaintiffs' Brief at 41. Plaintiffs then refer to a list of 
"natural" geographical, neighborhood divisions and other physical 
11/ These Reports are attached to the Bennion Affidavit as 
Exhibits "A" and "B." 
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features as the proper criteria. Id. In fact, Section 53-6-20 
contains no such list of criteria, and school boards are not lim-
ited to considering physical features in establishing boundaries. 
The decision of this Court in Kowallis establishes a much broader 
standard. Kowallis focuses in large part on promoting "harmoni-
ous development" and affording all students the opportunity for 
academic achievement. Kowallis, 77 P.2d at 353. 
In making its boundary decision, the Board considered 
the physical and geographical factors as well as numerous factors 
designed to promote the academic achievement and social develop-
ment of the students. After numerous hearings, lengthy studies 
and deliberations, the Board adopted the boundary plan. While 
Plaintiffs may disagree with the plan the Board adopted, the 
record establishes that as a matter of law the Board's decision 
was not arbitrary and capricious. 
E. Plaintiffs Other Arguments Regarding The Boundary 
Decision Are Without Merit. 
In their argument relating to the statutory powers of 
the Board, Plaintiffs again assert that parents have a constitu-
tional right to send their children to the school of their 
choice. Plaintiffs1 Brief at. pp. 36-37. For the reasons stated 
at pages 20-23, supra, the Board's decision did not violate any 
constitutional parental rights of Plaintiffs. Similarly, Plain-
tiffs' argument that students in Utah have a statutory right to 
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attend a particular school is not supported by statute. There is 
no right to send a child to a school in another district. 
Rather, there is a statutory framework allowing districts the 
option of admitting a student from outside their district. See 
Utah Code Ann. SS 53A-2-203 & 53A-2-205 (1988) (formerly §§ 
53-4-16 & 53-1-18) (board permission required for a child resid-
ing in another district or out of state to attend; board may 
charge tuition). As noted in the Kowallis case, Plaintiffs1 
argument that parents have a right to choose a particular school 
is not well taken. See pages 29-30, supra. 
The Board, in making its boundary decision, acted 
within the scope of the authority delegated to it by the legisla-
ture. They considered the views of professional educators, pub-
lic comment and the suggestions of numerous advisory committees 
in arriving at its decision. The decision was a discretionary 
one vested in the Board and not subject to review by courts 
absent compelling reasons. 
CONCLUSION 
The only issues before this Court are whether the 
Board's boundary decision violates Utah Constitution, Article X, 
Section 8 or exceeds the authority conferred on the Board by Utah 
law. 
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Education, like society itself, is in a constant state 
of flux. This court and the legislature have consistently given 
to Boards of Education broad discretion in determining what is 
necessary to promote education. Those discretionary decisions 
will not be disturbed for less than compelling reasons. In the 
case at bar, Plaintiffs disagree with the criteria used. How-
ever, their recourse is not through the court system, but through 
the political process. The Board1s decision does not violate the 
Utah Constitution. The decision is within the Board's authority 
and expertise and was made after much deliberation and discus-
sion. The District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
the Board should be affirmed. 
DATED this 16th day of August, 1989. 
M. Byron Fisher 
John E. S. Robson 
Douglas J. Payne 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF l/TSH r*'/+ 
:Vv 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
MARIA ESPINAL, DONNIE JAMES, 
G. HARVEY HAMILTON, JOYCE 
CAMPBELL and TERRY HOECKER, 
for themselves and all others 
similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
SALT LAKE CITY BOARD 
OF EDUCATION, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No: C-88-237W 
This matter is before the court on defendant's, the 
Salt Lake City Board of Education's, (the "Board's") motion to 
dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment, and on the 
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. This court heard oral 
arguments on July 1, 1988. Prior to the hearing the court had 
read all memoranda submitted by the parties. John E. S. Robson 
and Douglas J. Payne represented the defendant. Parker M. 
Nielson represented the plaintiff. After oral arguments the 
court took the matters under advisement and read four 
depositions. After further consideration the court now renders 
the following memorandum decision and order. 
Facts 
The "Board" controls schools within the Salt Lake City 
School District. The Board closed one of the district's four 
high schools and redrew attendance zones. In redrawing the 
attendance zones the Board attempted to balance the 
achievement level of students, the race of students, the number 
of students, and neighborhood cohesiveness in order to have three 
relatively equal high schools in the district. In order to 
create the three relatively equal high school zones the Board 
jerimanded the attendance zones and resorted to busing in some 
cases. 
The plaintiff is unhappy with the boundary changes and 
has brought this action challenging the Board's authority to rely 
on the factors which it relied on. 
Jurisdiction 
The first matter before the court is whether the court 
has jurisdiction. 
Plaintiff originally brought this action in state 
court. The defendants removed the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1441(b) and (c).1 
1
 These statutes provide in pertinent part: 
(b) Any civil action of which the 
district courts have original jurisdiction 
founded on a claim or right arising under the 
Constitution, treaties or laws of the United 
States shall be removable without regard to 
the citizenship or residence of the parties. 
Any other such action shall be removable only 
if none of the parties in interest properly 
joined and served as defendants is a citizen 
of the State in which such action is brought. 
(c) Whenever a separate and independent 
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Plaintiff claims that this court does not have original 
jurisdiction over these claims as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) 
for two reasons. First, plaintiff claims that for this court to 
have jurisdiction over a federal question an amount over 
$10,000.00 must be in controversy. Second, plaintiff claims the 
complaint does not state a federal claim. Plaintifffs first 
argument regarding the amount in controversy is based on a 
statute which Congress repealed over eight years ago. Prior to 
1980 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provided: 
The district court shall have original 
jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the 
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or 
value of $10,000.00 exclusive of interest and 
costs, and arises under the constitution, 
laws, or treaties of the United States. 
However, in 1980 Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
The statute now provides: 
The district court shall have original 
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising 
under the constitution, laws, or treaties of 
the United States. 
Thus, plaintiff's first challenge to jurisdiction is based on a 
claim or cause of action, which would be 
removable if sued upon alone, is joined with 
one or more otherwise non-removable claims or 
causes of action, the entire case may be 
removed and the district court may determine 
all issues therein, or, in its discretion, 
may remand all matters not otherwise within 
its original jurisdiction. 
3 
repealed statute. There is no longer any requirement that an 
amount over $10,000.00 be in controversy. Thus, so long as 
plaintiff has pled claims based on federal law or the federal 
constitution this court has jurisdiction. 
Plaintifffs second challenge to jurisdiction is that 
the complaint does not state a claim arising under federal law or 
the federal constitution. In determining whether plaintifffs 
complaint states a cause of action under federal law the court 
looks solely at the complaint. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Aauillard. 
496 F.Supp. 1038 (M.D. La. 1980). 
The plaintiff is the master of the complaint and thus 
can choose not to plead federal claims and rely solely on state 
remedies thereby preventing the defendants from removing the case 
from state to federal court. Sullivan v. First Affiliated 
Securities. Inc.. 813 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1987). However, if 
plaintiff intentionally or unintentionally raises a claim under 
federal law plaintiff no longer is the master of the forum in 
which the matter will be heard. 
In briefly scanning the complaint it is apparent that 
plaintiff has raised claims based on federal law and the United 
States Constitution. 
In 5 4 plaintiff relies on 20 U.S.C. §§ 1706 and 1708; 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 2000(c)-6 and 2000(c)-8; and the United States 
Constitution. In f 11 plaintiff cites several provisions of the 
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United States Code. In 1 37 plaintiff refers to the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and the Equal Education Act of 1974. In !J 41 and 42 
plaintiff raises claims of race discrimination. Given 
plaintifffs earlier reference to claims arising under the 
constitution and the laws of the United States these allegations 
appear to be claims based on the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. In 55 46 and 47 plaintiff relies on 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1713 and 20 U.S.C. § 1758. In 5 53 plaintiff cites 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1713. In 1 55 plaintiff claims "defendant has deprived 
plaintiff . . . of their rights, privileges, and immunities 
secured by the constitution and laws of the United States . . . 
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 2000(c)-6 and 2000(c)-8." In 
5 (e) of plaintifffs prayer for relief plaintiff seeks a remedy 
based on 20 U.S.C. § 1715. 
Given plaintiff1s repeated reference to federal 
statutes and the United States Constitution plaintiff has 
attempted to state claims based on federal law. Unless these 
federal claims are wholly insubstantial such that they should be 
dismissed as obviously being without merit federal jurisdiction 
exists. Seneca Nursing Home v. Kansas State Board of Social 
Welfare, 490 F.2d 1324, 1328 (10th Cir. 1974). 
This court is of the opinion that plaintiff has raised 
claims based on federal law and the federal constitution which 
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are not wholly insubstantial. Therefore, the defendant properly 
removed this case to federal court. 
Federal Claims 
In reviewing the complaint it appears plaintiff has 
raised four federal claims. First, plaintiff argues that race 
cannot be considered in assigning students to a school. Second, 
if race is considered it can only be considered if needed to 
correct the effects of past discrimination. Third, plaintiff 
argues that the Board's plan unreasonably interferes with the 
parents' right to raise their children. Fourth, plaintiff may 
have raised a claim based on title 4 of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act. 
Consideration of Race in Drawing Boundary Lines 
The Board considered race as one of many factors in 
assigning students to particular schools.2 
The Board considered race so as to insure to the extent 
practicable that each school would contain a representative 
sample of the community at large. Even though this racial 
classification is designed to insure schools are racially 
balanced, any classification based on race must pass a heightened 
degree of scrutiny. 
A majority of United States Supreme Court Justices have 
The other factors considered were the achievement level 
of the student, the number of students attending each high school 
and neighborhood cohesiveness. 
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not agreed on the exact level of heightened scrutiny to be 
applied where race conscious classifications, designed to benefit 
an historically disadvantaged class, are made. Some Justices 
would uphold affirmative action classifications only under the 
strictest level of scrutiny. As Justice Powell has stated: 
"Race classifications are acceptable only if the means chosen are 
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest." 
University of California Regents v. Bakke. 438 U.S. 265, 359 
(1978). Other Justices have viewed benign racial classifi-
cations3 under a less exacting standard. Justice Brennan joined 
by Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun in University of 
California Regents v. Bakke. applied a mid-level degree of 
scrutiny and held that: "Racial classifications designed to 
further remedial purposes must serve important governmental 
interests and must be substantially related to achievement of 
those objectives." University of California Regents v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. at 359. 
Regardless of the correct degree of scrutiny to be 
applied the School Board's use of race as a factor withstands the 
strictest level of constitutional scrutiny. Justice Powell in 
University of California Regents v. Bakke acknowledged that the 
3
 By benign racial classifications the court is referring 
to racial classifications designed to benefit an historically 
disadvantaged class of persons. See University of California 
Regents v. Bakke. 438 U.S. 265, 358. 
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government has a compelling interest in having a diverse student 
body attending schools. Justice Powell stated: 
Students with a particular background whether 
it be ethnic, geographic, culturally 
advantaged, or disadvantaged, may bring . . . 
experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich 
the training of its student body and better 
equip its graduates to render with 
understanding their vital service to 
humanity. 
University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314. 
Justice Powell struck down the University of California's 
affirmative action program only because the California program 
relied solely on race without considering any other factor. In 
this case the School Board has considered factors other than race 
in attemptincj to create three equally balanced schools. 
Accordingly, the School Boards use of race as a factor 
in assigning students did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 
School Board's Authority to Consider Race Absent deJure 
Segregation 
Plaintiff also argues that the School Board, if it does 
consider race as a factor in assigning students can only do so if 
it is attempting to remedy a past constitutional violation. This 
argument appears to be based on 42 U.S.C. § 2000(c)-6 and 20 
U.S.C. § 1754. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000(c)-6 outlines the procedure the United 
States Attorney General should use when bringing suit to enforce 
a student's rights to attend a desegregated public school. This 
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section also contains a provision limiting the power of federal 
courts to order transportation of students in order to achieve a 
racial balance, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(c)-6 provides in pertinent 
part: 
Nothing herein shall empower any official or 
a court of the United States to issue any 
order seeking to achieve a racial balance in 
any school by requiring the transportation of 
pupils or students from one school to another 
or to one school district to another in order 
to achieve such racial balance, or otherwise 
enlarge the existing power of the court to 
ensure compliance with the constitutional 
standards. 
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted this 
provision as preventing federal courts from ordering busing in 
cases of de facto segregation.4 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Board of Education. 402 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1971). 
Plaintiff argues that 42 U.S.C. § 2000(c)-6 when read 
in conjunction with 20 U.S.C. § 1754 prevents the School Board 
from ordering busing in cases of de facto segregation. 
20 U.S.C. § 1754 provides: 
The proviso of section 407(a) of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 providing in substance 
that no court or official of the United 
States shall be empowered to issue any order 
seeking to achieve a racial balance in any 
De facto segregation occurs when racial imbalance exists 
but there is no showing that the racial imbalance is caused by 
deliberate state action. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
Education. 402 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1971). When segregation occurs as 
a result of deliberate state action it is referred to as deJure 
segregation. Keves v. School District No. 1. 413 U.S. 189, 208 
(1973) . 
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school by requiring the transportation of 
pupils or students from one school to another 
or one school district to another in order to 
achieve such racial balance, or otherwise 
enlarge the existing power of the court to 
insure compliance with constitutional 
standards shall apply to all public school 
pupils and to every public school system, 
public school and public school board, as 
defined by Title IV, under all circumstances 
and conditions and at all times in every 
State, district, territory, Commonwealth, or 
possession of the United States, regardless 
of whether the residence of such public 
school pupils or the principal offices of 
such public school system, public school or 
public school board is situated in the 
northern, eastern, western, or southern part 
of the United States. 
Plaintiff contends that 20 U.S.C. § 1754 turns public 
school board officials into federal officials and thus, as 
federal officials, the school board cannot order busing absent a 
showing of deJure segregation. 
The legislative history and cases interpreting 20 
U.S.C. § 1754 do not support plaintiff's interpretation of the 
statute. The purpose of 20 U.S.C. § 1754 when read in 
conjunction with 42 U.S.C. § 2000(c)-6 is to limit the power of 
federal officials, and to prohibit those federal officials from 
ordering public school pupils, public school systems, or public 
school boards to transport students absent a finding of deJure 
segregation. See Darville v. Dade County School Board, 497 F.2d 
1002 (5th Cir. 1974). 
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Several federal courts have held that public school 
officials are free to adopt voluntary plans promoting racial 
balance in the public schools subject to the limits on 
affirmative action previously discussed. See Offerman v. 
Nitkowski. 378 F.2d 22 (2nd Cir. 1967); National Association for 
Neighborhood Schools of Pittsburgh. Inc. v. Board of Public 
Education. 497 F.Supp. 471 (W.D. Pa. 1980). 
These lower court decisions are supported by holdings 
from the United States Supreme Court. In Swann v. Board of 
Education. 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) the court stated: 
School authorities are traditionally charged 
with broad power to formulate and implement 
educational policy and might well conclude, 
for example, that in order to prepare 
students to live in a pluralistic society 
each school should have a prescribed ratio of 
Negro to white student reflecting the 
proportion of the district as a whole. 
Another case that this court finds persuasive is Local 
No. 93 v. City of Cleveland. 478 U.S. 501, 106 S.Ct. 3063 (1986). 
In City of Cleveland the United States Supreme Court approved a 
voluntary agreement between minority firefighters and the City of 
Cleveland calling for an affirmative action plan to promote and 
hire more minority firemen. The union challenged the city's 
action claiming that federal law prohibited the city from 
adopting an affirmative action plan absent a finding of past 
discrimination. The union based its claim on 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000(e)-5(g). This statute prohibits courts from entering an 
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order reinstating an employee or giving other available remedies 
unless the employee can show that he or she was adversely 
affected on the job because of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin. The union reasoned that since a court could not 
order affirmative action absent a finding of past discrimination 
the city should also be prohibited from implementing an 
affirmative action program absent proof of discrimination. The 
United States Supreme Court rejected this argument. The Court 
held that the voluntary race conscious affirmative action plan 
adopted by the City of Cleveland was permissible. 
Though the Citv of Cleveland case involved a claim in 
the employment context there are striking parallels to this case. 
First, federal officials in the Citv of Cleveland and in this 
case cannot order a remedy absent proof of prior race 
discrimination, Second, non-federal officials voluntarily 
adopted a system that insures minorities will not be 
disadvantaged. 
This court is of the opinion that voluntary integration 
whether it is in the workplace or in the schools is permissible 
so long as factors other than race are also considered. To hold 
otherwise and prohibit public officials from voluntarily 
integrating the schools would be contrary to the strong policies 
expressed in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
As the United States Supreme Court stated in United Steel Workers 
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v, Weber. 443 U.S. 193f 204 (1979): 
It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered 
by the nation's concern over centuries of 
racial injustice and intended to improve the 
lot of those who have been excluded from the 
American dream for so long constituted the 
first legislative prohibition of all 
voluntary, private, race conscious efforts to 
abolish traditional patterns of racial 
segregation and hierarchy. 
Further, the Board could not possibly have made 
everyone happy with the rezoning process. If the Board would 
have rezoned the district and increased the percentage of 
minority students in any one school the Board would likely be 
defending a suit for deJure segregation. See Diaz v. San Jose 
Unified School District. 733 F.2d 660f 664 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(school board's decision to draw attendance areas in a manner 
that achieves or maintains ethnic imbalance is unconstitutional). 
Given the realities of the situation, the Board made a 
tough decision which plaintiffs' counsel's concedes some agree 
with, some disagree with, and some don't care about. 
This court cannot possibly operate the school system. 
The operation of a local school system in a non-discriminatory 
manner is the responsibility of local officials. Only when local 
officials ignore that responsibility should a federal court step 
in. National Association for Neighborhood Schools of Pittsburg, 
Inc. v. Board of Public Education. 497 F.Supp. 471, 480 (W.D. Pa. 
1980). Given the long history and public debate involved in the 
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closing of South High School and the rezoning of the district it 
would be impossible for this court to say that the School Board 
has ignored its responsibility to operate the school district in 
a non-discriminatory manner. 
Accordingly, the Board did not violate the United 
States Code or the United States Constitution in adopting a 
voluntary race conscious school zoning plan. In factf by 
adopting a race conscious plan the district may have prevented a 
lawsuit which might very well have been successful. 
Parents' Right to Make Reasonable Choices in the Education of 
Their Children. 
Plaintiff claims that she has a constitutional right to 
make choices about how her children are to be educated. 
Plaintiff is correct. Parents do have certain rights in raising 
children that the state cannot interfere with absent a compelling 
state interest. 
For instance, a parents1 strongly held religious 
beliefs must be balanced against the state1s need to set 
educational standards. Often, the parents' First Amendment 
rights are more important than the state interest in 
standardizing education. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 
(1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
A state law abridging a child's free speech rights 
might also have to give way if it unduly interferes with a 
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parents' or student's free speech rights. Mever v, Nebraska. 262 
U.S. 390 (1923); Tinker v. Pes Moines Independent Community 
School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
Plaintiff relies on the above cases claiming that her 
right to direct the education of her children takes priority over 
the state's rights to create school attendance zones. The court 
disagrees. 
Freedom of religion and free speech are rights 
guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Any law which interferes with a fundamental rights 
must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. 
Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. at 213-215. However, the right to 
attend a particular school is not a fundamental right. Bauza v. 
Morales Carrion. 578 F.2d 447 (1st Cir. 1978). Thus, the 
district zoning decision need only be rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest. Rovster Guano Company v. Virginia. 
253 U.S. 412, 415 (1925). "Providing public schools ranks at the 
apex of the function of a state." Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. 
at 213. Thus, the state has a legitimate interest in controlling 
education. Further, dividing students up to insure a diverse 
student body is related to the state's interest in education. 
University of California Regents v, Bakke. 438 U.S. at 314. 
Accordingly, plaintifffs Fourteenth Amendment claim 
based on parents' rights is dismissed. 
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Title 4 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
The court has had some difficulty in interpreting 
plaintiff's complaint to determine if any other federal claims 
are being raised. There is a possibility that plaintiff has 
raised a claim based on Title 4 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (42 
U.S.C. § 2000(c)-2000(c)-9). 
If plaintiff has attempted to bring a claim based on 42 
U.S.C. § 2000(c)-6 that claim is dismissed because that section 
applies to federal and not state or local officials. See 
McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971). 
Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss all of 
plaintifffs claims based on federal law and the United States 
Constitution is granted. 
Propriety of Deciding State Law Claims 
At the beginning of this opinion the court was not in a 
position to say that plaintiff's federal claims were so 
insubstantial that this court could summarily dismiss them. Only 
after a thorough review of the parties' contentions and the 
applicable law has this court been able to make a decision. 
Thus, the question presently before the court is 
whether to retain jurisdiction over plaintiff's remaining state 
law claims or remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1441(c) provides: 
(c) Whenever a separate and independent 
claim or cause of action, which would be 
removable if sued upon alone, is joined with 
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one or more otherwise non-removable claims or 
causes of action, the entire case may be 
removed and the district court may determine 
all issues therein, or, in its discretion, 
may remand all matters not otherwise within 
its original jurisdiction. 
In making this decision the court is guided by cases 
where courts have exercised discretion in hearing or dismissing 
pendent state law claims after the claims giving rise to federal 
jurisdiction have been disposed of. 
When federal claims are dismissed and the only 
remaining issues are pendent state law claims a trial judge must 
exercise discretion in deciding whether to proceed on the state 
law claims. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
Often, when the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial 
courts choose to exercise their discretion in favor of also 
dismissing the pendent state law claims. McFaddin Express. Inc. 
v. Adlev Corporation. 346 F.2d 424, 427 (2nd Cir. 1965). The 
McFaddin court upheld the district courts decision to dismiss 
the state law claims after the federal claims had been dismissed 
holding "where the federal claim is dismissed on the pleadings it 
smacks of the tail wagging the dog to continue with the federal 
hearing on the state claims.11 
However, the court need not in every case dismiss when 
the federal claims are removed from the case prior to trial. In 
Rasado v. Wvman. 397 U.S. 397 (1970), the United States Supreme 
Court upheld the district court's discretion to exercise 
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jurisdiction over a pendent state law claim when the federal 
claims had become moot prior to trial. In upholding the district 
court*s decision the United States Supreme Court looked at the 
policy considerations favoring the exercise of pendent 
jurisdiction. Those considerations include judicial economy, 
convenience, and fairness to the litigants. Jones v. Inter-
mountain Power Project. 794 F.2d 546, 550 (10th Cir. 1986). 
In this case both parties have expended numerous hours 
briefing the state law issues and the parties orally argued their 
positions at the July 1st hearing. Further, this court has spent 
numerous hours reviewing the parties1 arguments and the 
applicable law. Thus, in one respect it might be more efficient 
for this court to decide the remaining state law issues. 
However, there is an issue that this court feels takes 
precedence over the convenience factor. The United States 
Supreme Court in Rasado also considered the countervailing policy 
of federalism. Rasado v. Wvman, 397 U.S. at 403. When the state 
claims involve issues where strong federal policies are involved 
federalism concerns favor a federal court deciding the pendent 
state claims. Rasado v. Wvman. 397 U.S. at 404. However, when 
the pendent claims involve issues or first impression or novel 
issues based on unclear state law, state judges, and not federal 
judges, should hear the case. 
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In Navlor v. Case and McGrath. Inc., 585 F.2d 557 (2nd 
Cir. 1978) the circuit court held that the district judge abused 
his discretion when he failed to remand the case after the 
federal claims giving rise to removal had been dismissed. The 
remaining state law claims involved issues of first impression 
regarding the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. 
The circuit court did not express any opinion as to the 
correctness of the district judge's interpretation of the 
Connecticut statue. Rather, the circuit court stated: 
It is well for federal courts to remember 
that in such a case as the present one a 
federal court can only try to ascertain state 
law, whereas the state has provided a unified 
method for the formation of policy and the 
determination of issues by the Commissioner 
of Consumer Protection and in the state 
courts. (emphasis added). 
Navlor v, Case and McGrath, Inc.. 585 F.2d at 565. 
Plaintiff's claim based on Utah Code § 53-6-420 and 
plaintiff's claim based on Utah Constitution, Article X, section 
8 are the type of claims that should be decided in the first 
instance by state court judges. The court is convinced that 
federalism concerns take priority over any convenience or 
inconvenience to the parties. The briefing done in this court 
can be used in any further state court proceeding. Further, the 
proceedings in this court have simplified the issues in that the 
only issues remaining for a state court judge to hear will be the 
state law claims based on Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-420 and Utah 
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Constitution, Article X, section 8. 
Coqcliisiqq 
Accordingly, all claims based on federal law and the 
United States Constitution are dismissed with prejudice. 
Plaintiff's claim based on Utah Code Ann, § 53-6-420 and Utah 
Constitution, Article X, section 8 are remanded to the state 
court. The defendants are requested to submit an appropriate 
order. 
2A Dated this o\/7\ day of July, 1988 
David K. Winder 
United States District Judge 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing to the following named 
counsel this o Z A day of July, 1988. 
Parker M. Nielson, Esq. 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
M. Byron Fisher, Esq. 
John E.S. Robson, Esq. 
Randy K. Johnson, Esq. 
Douglas J. Payne, Esq. 
215 South State Street, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Kent B. Linebaugh, Esq. 
370 East South Temple #401 
Salt Lake city, Utah 84111 
<g^^L JZP. iZZ/^/ 
Secretary 
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ADDENDUM B 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
DEC 1 1988 
H. Olxg/Hlndley. Cl«rk 3rd Dirt. Court 
Ddf^ uiy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARIA ESPINAL, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY BOARD OF 
EDUCATION, 
Defendant• 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-88-1444 
The issue to be decided.by this Court is: Does Utah Code 
Ann., Section 53-6-20, authorize the Salt Lake Board of Education 
to set school boundaries in such a way as to achieve a "balanced 
mix of resident high, middle and low achieving students?" The 
issue is a critical one because it delineates the balance between 
the rights of parents to control the education of their children 
and the power of the state to operate a public education system. 
At the beginning, it is important to say that this case does 
not involve a scheme to reduce the impact of prior racial 
discrimination. The segregation cases from the federal courts 
are, therefore, inapplicable. All of the federal claims have 
been dismissed. The only issue at bench is the power of the 
school board under the state statute. 
The legislature has provided that boards of education shall 
have the following powers: 
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Every local board may: 
(1) spend minimum school program funds for 
programs and activities for which the State 
Board of Education has established minimum 
standards or rules under Section 53-2-12.1; 
(2) purchase, sell, and make improvements on 
school sites, buildings, and equipment and 
construct, erect, and furnish school 
buildings. School sites or buildings may 
only be conveyed or sold on board resolution 
affirmed by at least two-thirds of the 
members; 
(3) participate in the joint construction or 
operation of a school attended by children in 
the district and children residing in 
adjoining districts either within or outside 
the state. The agreement for joint operation 
or construction of a school shall be signed 
by the president of the board of each 
participating district, include a mutually 
agreed upon pro rata cost, and be filed with 
the State Board of Education; 
(4) establish, locate, and maintain 
kindergarten, elementary, secondary, and 
vocational schools. Children seeking to 
enter school must be at least five years of 
age before September 2 of the year in which 
admission is sought; 
(5) establish and support school libraries 
and authorize, and pay for out of district 
funds, a compilation of the history of the 
district; 
(6) collect damages for the loss, injury, or 
destruction of school property; 
(7) engage in guidance and counseling 
services for children and their parents prior 
to enrollment of the children in school; 
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(8) apply for, receive, and administer funds 
made available through the programs of the 
Federal Government, Federal funds are not 
considered funds within the school district 
budget under Chapter 20 of Title 53• Federal 
funds are expended for the purposes for which 
they are received and are accounted for by 
the Board. 
(9) organize school safety patrols and adopt 
rules under which the patrols promote student 
safety. A student appointed to a safety 
patrol shall be age 11 or over, or age ten or 
over in elementary schools that do not 
include a sixth grade, and shall have written 
parental consent for the appointment. Safety 
patrol members shall not direct vehicular 
traffic or be stationed in the portion of the 
highway intended for vehicular traffic use. 
No liability shall attach either to the 
school district, the board of education, an 
individual board member, a parent of a safety 
patrol member, an authorized volunteer 
assisting the program, or other school 
authority by virtue of the organization, 
maintenance or operation of a school safety 
patrol; 
(10) on its own behalf, or on behalf of an 
educational institution for which the board 
is the direct governing body, accept private 
grants, loans, gifts, endowments, devises or 
bequests which are made for educational 
purposes. These contributions are not 
subject to appropriation by the Legislature; 
(11) appoint and fix the compensation of a 
compliance officer to issue citations for 
violations of Subsection 76-10-105(2). A 
person may not be appointed to serve as a 
compliance officer without the person1s 
consent. A teacher or student may not be 
appointed as a compliance officer. 
(12) adopt bylaws and rules for its own 
procedures; 
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(13) make and enforce rules necessary for the 
control and management of the district 
schools. All board rules and policies shall 
be in writing, filed, and referenced for 
public access; and 
(14) do all things necessary for the 
maintenance, prosperity, and success of the 
schools and the promotion of education. 
Utah Code Ann., Section 53-6-20. 
In this statute the legislature empowers boards of education 
to establish and locate schools. And in the final clause the 
boards are given authority to "do all things necessary for the 
maintenance, prosperity, and success of the schools and the 
promotion of education.11 
Obviously, it is lfnecessary" that boundary lines between 
schools are drawn. The question is whether in drawing those 
boundaries social, economic and racial balancing can be taken 
into consideration. Plaintiffs characterize this as "social 
engineering," and allege that it is beyond the "necessary" powers 
of the school board. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed a similar problem in 1932 
when the power of schools to provide extra-curricular activities 
was challenged. In Beard v. Board of Education of North Summit 
School District, 81 Utah 51, 16 P.2d 900 (1932), the court 
articulated the following principle: 
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The board of education, being a creation of 
the Legislature, has only such powers as are 
expressly conferred upon it and such implied 
powers as are necessary to execute and carry 
into effect its express powers.... The court 
is not concerned with the policy, expediency, 
wisdom, or justice of a legislative enactment 
conferring powers on boards of education of 
school districts, and where such authorities 
act within their powers, in the absence of a 
clear abuse, the courts will sustain the 
exercise of such power. 
81 Utah at 60. 
The statute now in effect still does not specifically 
empower boards of education to provide for extracurricular 
activities; but certainly it has been accepted that school 
dances, parties, football games and the like are a legitimate 
part of the educational process. It can be argued that they are 
not "necessary for the maintenance, prosperity, and success of 
the schools"; indeed it may be argued that teaching of any 
subject beyond reading, writing and arithmetic is not 
"necessary." 
The point is: it is not for the court to substitute its 
judgment for the judgment of the elected board of education. As 
the court said in Beard, "the question for determination is one 
of power rather than of policy." 
When the statute says that the boards have authority to do 
what is "necessary" to promote education, it means "necessary" in 
the opinion of the board; not "necessary" in the opinion of the 
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court. The court must sustain the action of the board if under 
any reasonable view the function in question can be considered 
"necessary." 
The balancing of the student body along social, racial and 
economic lines can be defended as a legitimate part of the 
educational process. Certainly the Board may believe that 
students get a better educational experience in such an 
environment. Plaintiffs and many others may disagree; but their 
remedy is at the ballot box, not in the courts. 
Plaintiffs1 further argument that the order creates a 
partisan qualification for attendance at the schools is also 
without merit in my opinion. The plain language of that 
constitutional provision clearly does seem intended to apply to 
this situation. 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
Plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. I request 
that Mr. Robson prepare an appropriate Order. 
Dated this \ day of December, 1988. 
J^c^^Ja^u^i^ 
SCOTT DANIELS 
..* .e A TRUE COP* OF AN DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
"^355£E*3M™™*^ ATTEST 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this / day of December, 1988s 
Parker M. Nielson 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
M. Byron Fisher 
John E. S. Robson 
Attorneys for Defendant 
215 S. State, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
